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Investigating the Russian economic footprint through outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and the activities of Russian multinational enterprises (MNEs) has not become either outdated or less interesting, even though, understandably, most of the current attention on Russian influence in Europe has been 
focused on direct interference in political affairs. In a recent study, we 
have assessed the international expansion of Russian MNEs, with a 
focus on home-country push factors, Europe and five EU-member 
Central and East European (CEE) states, including the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Indeed, we have 
established some fascinating facts and figures.
 Russia has a long history of OFDI, with the golden era ending 
with the global financial meltdown. By that time, Russian MNEs had 
become significant factors in international capital flows, though they 
have never been ranked among the largest MNEs. Having faced two 
financial crises over the past 10 years that interrupted the upward 
trend (the last one caused by low oil prices and Western sanctions 
against Russia over its actions in Ukraine), the current period is 
probably rather about their survival.
 Among the important features of Russian OFDI, the most well-
known ones are round-tripping (i.e. FDI leaving the country and 
returning) and trans-shipping that allow Cyprus, the Netherlands and 
the British Virgin Islands to lead the unchanging list of Russian FDI 
recipients (according to official statistics from Russia’s central bank). 
Round-tripping leads to Russian FDI being overestimated in both 
directions. In addition, round-tripping and the offshore orientation of 
Russian OFDI are strongly related to negative domestic push factors 
(including the poor business climate in Russia), as well as to the tax 
minimization strategies of Russian MNEs. Negative push factors are 
very important in driving corporate decisions to invest abroad. On the 
other hand, concerning a typical positive push factor, the Russian 
state’s role in directly promoting foreign expansion, one can argue 
that the state supports only the largest Russian MNEs but Russian 
OFDI is not dominated by state-controlled companies (among the 
top 20 Russian non-financial MNEs, the number and combined value 
of foreign assets are higher for private companies than for state-
controlled ones). State-owned companies possess many advantages 
that can help them internationalize. However, the Russian state’s 
influence on private companies is also frequently quite significant. 
One characteristic feature is that the leading Russian private MNEs 
have an oligarchic ownership structure.
 Due to the specific features of Russian OFDI and the lack of 
statistics referring to the ultimate host/investing country, the role 
of certain host countries is underestimated, while that of others is 
overstated. Nevertheless, Europe’s leading role in Russian OFDI 
remains unchallenged. However, it should be emphasized that 
Europe’s share has been falling. This began many years ago and 
was not directly linked to EU–Russia relations, which – in turn – 
have definitely reached a very low point at present. As the Minsk II 
ceasefire agreement of February 2015 has not been met, the end of 
the sanctions by the European Union, Russia’s prime export market 
and the main destination of Russian OFDI, is not in sight. Russia’s 
pivot towards Asia as a means of diversifying away from Europe had 
been formulated before the events in Ukraine. Nonetheless, despite 
some steps in this direction, a dramatic increase in Russian expansion 
has not been witnessed and is not projected.
 In Europe, possibly Italy, Germany and the UK are the largest 
recipients of Russian FDI (based on the FDI project database of the 
Moscow-based IMEMO Institute). In Central and Eastern Europe, 
Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania can be mentioned. The five CEE 
countries are not among the main destinations, though Russian FDI 
in the Czech Republic or Poland is also not negligible. Even Slovenia 
has received notable Russian-involved companies. Nevertheless, 
company data demonstrate that the activities of Russian investors 
in the five CEE countries have been paved with failures. These have 
been evident in both divestments and unrealised plans. The low share 
of Russian investment in the five CEE countries may be referred to as 
business opportunities that the Russian parties have failed to exploit.
 In general, Russian OFDI is still dominated by oil and gas MNEs, 
though Russian businesses are represented practically in every 
sector. In our five CEE countries, most Russian FDI has been done 
in hydrocarbons, iron, steel and machinery, but banking, software 
solutions, electronic production, real estate and even the light industry 
have also been targeted.
 Regarding the theorems, all our research suggests that Russian 
OFDI follows Dunning’s eclectic paradigm or Ownership–Location–
Internalisation (OLI) of international production to a certain extent, but 
the extension of the OLI theorem with a home-country leg to OLIH is 
needed. We have tested this for the five CEE countries.
 Opposition to Russian investment could continue to grow in the 
EU. While examples of Russian pressure on companies to sell to 
them have been known to occur in CEE countries within the EU, there 
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are also already precedents in Western EU states for transactions 
that have failed because of resistance to Russian investment. In 
general, there is no need to worry about Russian OFDI, but some of 
the expressed concerns have certainly been attested. We believe that 
it is the Russian party who would benefit most from alleviating these 
fears.   
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